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INTRODUCTION

Situated on the right bank and nestled in a famous, old
quartier in Paris, France rests the picturesque former urban
resort for the French aristocracy at the Place des Vosges.2 Built in
the early 1600's, this area represented city-planning at its finest
as an escape to the countryside retreats that were popular among
European royalty at the time.3 Today, it stands amazingly well
preserved among its idyllic gardens, red brick house structures,
vaulted arcades, and long corridors. 4 This antiquated square in
the Marais, or marsh, district of the city hosted the famed duel
between the three Mignons of King Henri III and the three partisans of the Due de Guise in April of 1578 during the French
Wars of Religion.5 These two rival court parties engaged in menacing attacks against each other in the square as a rumored way
to resolve a dispute.6 However, the noted battle resulted in multiple deaths and seemingly irreparable, torturous agonies among
those injured and slain.7 Due to this incredible fight, public opinion soared; legends trickled through the winding streets of Paris
that the duel mimicked infamous ancient Roman brawls. Several
written texts erupted, and an array of stories romanticized what
seemed to be an illogical and hopeless loss of life.9
Stories like the one mentioned above elaborate the vast
depth, emotion, and history that quarrels bring between parties.
Around the same time, Spanish conquistadors thrashed through
vast, uncharted lands of the Americas conquering the native
2. KARL BAEDEKER, PARIS ET ENVIRONS: WITH ROUTES FROM LONDON TO PARIS 200
(18th rev. ed. Charles Scribner's Sons 1913); the word "quartier" in French translates
to "neighborhood" in English.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; BRIAN SANDBERG, WARRIOR PURSUITS: NOBLE CULTURE AND CIVIL CONFLICT
IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 170, (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2010).
6. See MARTHA WALKER FREER, HENRY III, KING OF FRANCE AND POLAND: His
COURT AND TIMES 62 (Vol. II, Dodd, Mead and Co. 1888) (showing that Henri and his
mignons would spend much of their day "adjusting their disputes"); see also THOMAS
WRIGHT, THE HISTORY OF FRANCE: FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME

763 (Vol. I, The London Prtg. and Publishing Co. 1856-62) (showing that Henry feared
and hated the house of Guise).
7. See MARIO READING, THE COMPLETE PROPHECIES OF NOSTRADAMUS 168
(Sterling Publishing Co., Inc. 2009).
8. Id. (showing that King Henri III and the Due de Guise had a "scrupulous reenactment of the arranged combat between the Horatii and the Curiatii" from
672-642 BC).
9. For a complete description of this story, see GEORGES BRRZOL, L'HISTOIRE
LICENCIEUSE: HENRI III ET SES MIGNONS (Les Editions des Bibliophiles 1935).
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tribes that thrived there; these American communities eventually
all but vanished and their adversaries met similar, disheartening
fates. 0 Thankfully, the development of modern society now allows
for flexible dispute resolution mechanisms, aside from battle, that
allow parties to settle peacefully and neutrally.
Today, international arbitration serves as an invaluable tool
both for parties to utilize the expertise of professionals and the
procedural securities common in legal proceedings in order to
ensure fairness, uniformity, and reliability. The term "arbitration" roughly refers to a private dispute resolution process that
begins when two or more parties agree to submit disputes to an
impartial tribunal consisting of one or more arbitrators." The
chosen tribunal must abide by certain procedural rules in order to
have a peaceful settlement of the dispute.12 The tribunal renders
an award, which finally and legally binds the parties involved,
and which judicial courts may recognize and enforce.13
In order to accomplish the impressive goals of arbitration, a
revolutionary change occurred in 1958 with the passage of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (hereinafter the "New York Convention").14 Countries around the world embraced this outlook on resolving
international disputes through arbitration and locked their signatures to the Convention with intent to be bound to it. 1" After the
passage of the New York Convention, other regional arbitration
10. See generally JIM OLLHOFF, THE CONQUISTADORS (ABDO Publishing Co. 2012).
11. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N
doc. A/40/17, Annex I, Art. 2 (June 21, 1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/1985Model arbitration.html [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Model Law].
12. MARK HULEATT-JAMES & NICHOLAS GOULD, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 20 (LLP Ltd., 2nd ed. 1999).
13. Id.; see also Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in GLOBAL
REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 601 (ICC
Publishing, Publication 693 2005), available at www.iccbooks.com.
14. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.
enforcement. convention.new.york. 1958/ [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
United States did not sign the New York Convention until 1971 and codified it at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08. See John P. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations
Convention on ForeignArbitralAwards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735,
737 (1971)..
15. See, e.g., Gloria Miccolli, International Commercial Arbitration, AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Jan. 15, 2012, 8:49 PM), http://www.asil.org/erg/
?page=arb (showing that over 140 countries have agreed to the New York Convention,
see supra note 13). For a complete and current list of all parties to the New York
Convention, see Status - 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
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instruments grew in popularity to encompass local ideals and
principles inherent throughout the world. 6 Thus, the Panama
Convention was born, and, as it gained notoriety, became a useful,
practical tool in American arbitration disputes.
Despite its wide acceptance today, arbitration among the
American nations took varied historical approaches." While the
United States developed an open mind to the arbitration process,
Latin American countries took much smaller reluctant steps to
widen an encompassing attitude toward arbitration.'" The United
States saw vast expansions in the realms of its own litigation and
alternative dispute resolution processes, but Latin American
countries long feared the North American and comparative European ideals of business and trade." Instead, the neighboring
countries to the south routinely preferred to utilize internal practices that compelled individuals and businesses to accept Latin
American local remedies instead of international arbitration.2 0
Now, scholars often refer to this domestic approach as the Calvo
Doctrine; it resisted the intrusion of foreign pressures in dispute
resolution and precluded foreign parties from arbitrating disputes
in Latin American contracts.2 ' However, over time, Latin America
slowly came to embrace the growing trend of internationalism and
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral
texts/arbitration/NYConvention status.html.
16. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, Jan 30. 1975, OAS Doc. OAS/Ser. A/20 (SEPF) (1975), reprinted in 14
I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, U.N. Treaty Series, vol. 484, p.
364, No. 7041, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/Imleurope.international.
commercial.arbitration.convention.geneva. 196 1/; Convention on the Settlement by
Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific, and Technical
Co-operation ("Moscow Convention"), May 26, 1972, official English translation by
UNCITRAL at 13 I.L.M. 5 (1974) ; see UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10; Spiros
V. Bazinas, Harmonization of International and Regional Trade Law: The
UNICTRAL Experience, 8 UNIF. L. REV. 53, 55 n.9 (2003).
17. See generally HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 20-22.
18. See id. at 22.
19. Id.
20. Manuel Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutions and
International Law, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 219 (1950) (showing that the Calvo
Doctrine's purpose compelled Aliens to use internal courts first in Latin America
rather than resorting to diplomatic channels).
21. See infra Sec. II(A); R. Doak Bishop & James E. Etri, International
Commercial Arbitration in South America, at 11-2, as reprinted in R. Doak Bishop,
The United States ' Perspective Toward International Arbitration with Latin
American Parties, 8 INT'L L. PRACTICum 63 (1995); Jonathan C. Hamilton, Three
Decades of InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1099, 1100
(2009); see also Garcia-Mora, supra note 19, at 219.
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its effects on arbitration.2 2 In fact, the treaties and conventions of
today provide ringing evidence of a long but noteworthy accept-

ance process.

23

Realizing the importance of resolving international disputes
rather than focusing on internal matters, the majority of American states gathered in unity to form a neutral arbitration process
in 1975.24 The processes that ensued created the legal document
called the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, more commonly known as the "Panama Convention".2 5 It served as a channel linking the American states
together and created a consistent arbitration process that bridged
the gap in foreign disputes. 26 Today, it functions as a steady document that has endured the test of time, and tribunals routinely
use it international disputes throughout the Americas. 2 7 It is
therefore important to understand the Panama Convention's
international role today juxtaposed with its important arbitration
counterpart: the New York Convention.
Currently, the United States and several Latin American
countries are parties to both the New York and Panama Conventions." While these documents may be similar in their overall
goals in international arbitration, courts, parties, and tribunals
still confuse the two and dispute how to apply them.2 9 In fact,
recent trends in United States case law demonstrate that courts
often apply these two separate Conventions identically. 30 Thus,
an important question arises as to whether it is prudent to treat
these two separate Conventions alike when scholars and practitioners developed them during different time periods; different
22. See, e.g., HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 22; Bishop & Etri, supra
note 20, at 11-2; Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1100.
23. See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1100 (showing a large number of Latin
American countries as parties to the Panama Convention, New York Convention, and
the ICSID Convention).
24. Id.; see also Garcia-Mora, supra note 19, at 205-08 (showing that the Latin
American States were previously making several attempts to incorporate the Calvo
Doctrine into a Pan-American Convention).
25. See generally Panama Convention, supra note 15.
26. See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1099.
27. Id. at 1101 (showing that there has been evolutionary expansion in the
Panama Convention's use, particularly since the 1990's); see also Organization of
American States, Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 14, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87.
28. See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1100, 1102.
29. See infra Sec. IV(B).
30. Id.
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parties signed them in different places, and; they represent different cultural and ideological backgrounds.
With these considerations in mind, this text traces the applicability and scope of the Panama Convention within international
commercial arbitration. While a historical appreciation and study
is included, this article primarily focuses on the treatment of the
Convention within the past decade. Thus, Section II of the paper
includes a comprehensive discussion of the historical attitudes
and doctrinal arbitral developments in the Americas. This section
traces the contours and appeal of the Panama Convention as an
important instrument by focusing on two areas: the varied historical context of arbitration in Latin America, and the legal structure
of international commercial arbitration within the United States.
Section III expands upon the appeal and acceptance of arbitration
within the framework of the Panama Convention in the Americas.
This section also highlights an important textual breakdown of
the overall arbitration process under the regional Convention and
its transformation on the status of arbitration in the Americas.
Section III also focuses on setting forth two recent United States
court decisions within the context of the Panama and New York
Conventions: the Termorio decision and the recent DRC, Inc. case.
Section IV provides a critical overview of the practical importance
of treating the Panama Convention as its own separate document.
This section is broken into three primary categories of analysis.
The first focuses on important textual differences between the
New York and the Panama Conventions. It analyzes six important disparities among the Conventions. These topics show that,
while the overall goals of the Conventions may ultimately be similar, each distinction can create friction between the two Conventions. The next category analyzes United States judicial confusion
between the two Conventions as well as some of the fundamental
weaknesses of the Conventions' arbitral developments in case law.
This section culminates with a discussion focusing on the need for
doctrinal distinctiveness between the two Conventions. Finally,
Section VII of this article concludes with some overall thoughts for
further reflection and final comments for consideration.

11.

RESISTANCE OR ACCEPTANCE? APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE AMERICAS

In an effort to advance the resolution of international disputes in the Americas, the Organization of American States,
(hereinafter the "OAS"), held a conference in 1975 that produced
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the Panama Convention."' This international arbitration document attempted to bridge different American approaches and
build a regional acceptance on the philosophy requiring the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards set forth in the New York
Convention.3 2 Thus, there are two salient reasons why the Panama Convention is appealing despite the disparities between the
American countries: it first embodies the resistant, historical
Latin American approaches [A], it and also represents the United
States' legal structures in the overall arbitration process [B].

A.

A HistoricalPerspective On Arbitration In Latin
American States

Historically, Latin American countries strongly opposed the
idea of arbitration in the development of their legal dispute settlement mechanisms. 3Southern American perspectives show that
their developments in the international realm took a slow, grueling process of over 100 years to comply with the arbitration system of today. 4 Tracing the historical steps chronologically, Latin
America went from a time of resistance under the Calvo Doctrine,
to openness under the New York Convention, and finally to
acceptance under a regional arbitration document and beyond."
Therefore, each of these stages that led to the eventual adoption of
the Panama Convention all favor its independent treatment incorporating Latin American ideals in settling disputes.
First, the Calvo Doctrine has long been hailed in Latin
America as the predominant force for settling disputes and
restricting international negotiations.3 6 Starting in the mid1800's, an Argentinian diplomat named Carlos Calvo created principles enumerated in his six-volume treatise entitled Le Doit
International Theorique et Pratique, translated as "The Theory
31. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1100.
32. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-2; see also Miccolli, supra note 14 (showing
that today, over 140 countries are signatories to the New York Convention).
33. See Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-1.
34. The Calvo Doctrine began in the mid-19th century where as the American
countries did not create the Panama Convention, supra note 15, until 1975.
35. See generally Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-1.
36. See generally Denise Manning-Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo
Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle: Equality of Foreign and National
Investors, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169, 1169 (1994); David E. Graham, The Calvo
Clause: Its Current Status as a ContractualRenunciation of Diplomatic Protection, 6
TEX. INT'L L. J. 289, 289 (1971).
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and Practice of International Law."" The significance of this doctrine emerged during the armed conflicts between Mexico and
France between 1831 and 1861 and showed that Latin American
approaches to international law created problems for these states
for years to come. 38 The creation of the Calvo Doctrine implemented a strong resistance toward international arbitration in
Latin American states.3 ' The basic premise of this doctrine flowed
from the idea that, in the international realm, jurisdiction
remained in the country where the dispute is located.4 0 In this
context, foreigners had to resort to using the local courts where
their claim occurred instead of using their own legal system.4 1
The justification behind the Calvo Doctrine developed during
political armed tensions between Mexico and France.42 It derived
from keeping the power of different countries in balance: Calvo
himself did not want the stronger, more powerful states to abuse
the jurisdictions or weaker, smaller states.4 3 This doctrine embodied the ideals of Latin American countries that wanted to restrict
outside influences, and many countries even adopted these principles into their own constitutions and national statutes.4 4 However, as foreign agreements arose and international investments
grew over time, Latin countries begrudgingly started to realize
that their hostility and reluctance to accept alternative dispute
resolution processes could in fact be hindering them in the modern
world.4 5 Therefore, many countries ultimately rejected the Calvo
Doctrine and began seeking other methods to resolve disputes.4 6
Second, beginning as far back as the 1950's through the
1970's, Latin America began to show trends of opening up to the
37. DONALD SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 17 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1955).

AND

38. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-2; Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1100.
39. See Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-1.
40. Id.; Hugo Caminos, The Latin American Contribution to InternationalLaw, 80
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 157, 157 (1986).
41. Caminos, supra note 39, at 160.
42. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-2.
43. See generally Bruce G. Rinker, The Future of Arbitration in Latin America: A
Study of Its Regional Development, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 480, 480 (1976);
International Fisheries Co (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, R.I.A.A. 691, 691
(1931). See also N. American Dredging Co. of Tx. (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States,
R.I.A.A. 21, 26 (1926) (for the leading arbitral decision upholding the validity of the
Calvo Doctrine).
44. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-2, 11-4; Rinker, supra note 42, at 492.
45. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-5.
46. See generally Manning-Cabrol, supra note 35, at 1169.
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idea of international arbitration,4 7 and the world saw vast transformations in the arbitration field with the passage of the New
York Convention.4 8 This arbitration instrument aimed to require
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards while simultaneously
allowing for uniform application in arbitration.4 9 It offered an
approach to international arbitration allowing for a single, final
forum at the arbitral situs and a quick resolution of disputes."
While foreign countries embraced the field of arbitration in
their dispute settlement systems, Latin American countries still
had hesitations and wanted to keep arbitration under their court's
auspices.5' However, States began to understand that instruments like the New York Convention allowed arbitration
processes to help resolve international disputes in a neutral forum
and reduce the time and expense of litigation.5 2 With the passage
of this Convention, the outlook of arbitration grew slowly but tremendously over time, and the Latin American states further
opened their ideals and adapted to the changes.5 3
Third, as the inter-American States realized that foreign
trade was increasing each year with a more globalized economy
developing, many countries began to accept the idea that a
regional mechanism would be a good way to resolve potential disputes that were also arising.54 In 1975, the Panama Convention
achieved this goal between the different inter-American countries
by providing a regional mechanism for dispute settlement." It
preserved important regional prerogatives inherent in Latin
American legal histories.5 ' However, it also promoted trade relations and globalization through a uniform dispute resolution
47. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-5 (showing that Article 136 of the Peruvian
Constitution in 1979 allowed arbitral clauses to be added in international loan
agreements); see generally Rinker, supra note 42, at 486-95.
48. New York Convention, supra note 13.
49. Bishop & Etri, supra note 20, at 11-6.
50. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2553 (Kluwer Law
International 3d. ed. 2009).
51. Joseph Jackson, Jr., The 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration:Scope, Application and Problems, 8. J. INT'L ARB. 91, 91-100
(1991).
52. Id. at 99.
53. See Charles Robert Norberg, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Unicorn or Beast of Burden, 5 PACE L. REV. 607, 608-13 (1984-1985).
54. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970) [hereinafter FAA];
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
55. See HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 22; BORN, supra note 49, at
2336-39.
56. See Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1103-4 (showing that the Compendium of
Latin American ArbitrationLaw tracks the enactment of the Panama and New York
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mechanism between the United States and Latin America.5 7
In creating this arbitration tool, the Panama Convention
attempted to form "a viable, treaty-based system for resolving
inter-American commercial disputes by arbitration going back a
quarter-century."58 During its passage, the Convention aimed to
achieve three primary objectives: (1) to persuade Latin American
states that were not party to an arbitration Convention at the
time to consider joining the Convention; (2) to encourage economic
expansion between the American states by providing a faster and
more impartial dispute resolution method;, and (3) to attain the
underlying political goal to enhance trade in the Americas.5 9 With
the help of the Panama Convention, inter-American arbitration
grew to place a significant imprint in dispute resolution and
attracted significant advancements to the older approaches in
Latin American law. Now, the Convention serves a valuable role
as a regional instrument in international settlements. Thus,
Latin America significantly advanced its dispute mechanisms
from resistance, to openness, and finally to acceptance by having
arbitration help resolve international disputes.6 0

B.

The United States Accepts Arbitration-Enabling
Legislations

Although Latin America took a sluggish route to accepting the
process of international arbitration, several national initiatives
within the United States reflected a popular trend of accepting
alternative dispute resolution processes. 6' As the popularity of
international arbitration grew after the passage of the New York
Convention, American lawyers grew to be much more accustomed
to using arbitral mechanisms over their Latin American counterparts. 62 Further, while Latin America did not have as many hisConventions throughout Latin America and notes the year each state adopted and/or
amended its domestic arbitration law).
57. See Paul E. Mason & Mauricio Gomm-Santos, New Keys to Arbitration in
Latin America, 25 J. INT'L ARB. 31, 40 (2008) (showing that arbitration is growing due
to the rise of trading blocs and in response to globalization); see generally Jackson,
supra note 50.
58. Jackson, supra note 50, at 90.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 97 (showing that (1) the party resisting enforcement of the award has
the burden of proof, and (2) the Panama Convention, as a regional convention,
overrides the New York Convention, as well as some local laws).
61. See Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 92. For a thorough discussion of the complete historical approach taken
by the United States, see generally Rinker, supra note 42, at 480.
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torical legislation arbitration statutes because of its traditional
bias against arbitration, the United States adopted the Panama
and New York Conventions in many state and federal arbitration
statutes.6 3 Therefore, two other focal areas directly correlate to
the appeal of international arbitration within the United States:
the UNCITRAL Model Law and Arbitration Rules as well as the
Federal Arbitration Act.
First, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (hereinafter "UNCITRAL") adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985.64 This set of arbitration
rules intended to provide greater uniformity to determine which
set of international laws would be applicable to contractual relationships between international parties.6 5 As of 2011, seven individual states in the United States have taken various approaches
adopting the Model Law into their local arbitration systems.66
This shows that since its passage in 1985, states within the
United States are gradually adopting the principle objectives of
the Model Law into their own legal systems.
Further, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976 prove to
be specifically important in relation to the Panama Convention:
these rules of procedure preemptively apply if the parties under
the Panama Convention cannot agree to a uniform procedure for
the arbitration.6 ' These arbitral rules allow parties significant
flexibility in choosing how to operate their proceedings, and further help create the sense of a harmonious arbitration model
between the American countries.6 9 Therefore, the UNCITRAL
Model Law and Arbitration Rules show the overlapping utility,
63. See supra Sec. II(A); H.R. 4314 (Pub. L. No. 101-369) implemented the
Panama Convention, supra note 15, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.; Jackson, supra
note 50, at 91 (showing that President Bush signed the Panama Convention into law
in 1990).
64. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10.
65. HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 23-25; PAULSSON, supra note 12,
at 610.
66. See Miccolli, supra note 14 (showing that California, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas have all adopted the Model Law); see also
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 10.
67. HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 23.
68. Id. at 22-25 (showing that the regional Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission rules of procedure, [hereinafter IACAC], apply and are now
incorporated into the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law Arbitration Rules, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (1976)).
69. Id.
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impact, and benefits of international arbitration enumerated in
the Panama Convention.
Second, in 2000, Congress codified and amended the Federal
Arbitration Act, (hereinafter the "FAA"), as another initiative to
reinforce the importance of arbitration.70 This Act passed in order
to have an American approach counteracting the "long-standing
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at
English common law."7 The FAA also correlates to several comparable state arbitration statutes, and both require the enforcement of arbitral agreements.7 2 Before the passage of the FAA,
Americans realized the benefits of arbitration that had existed for
decades 73 and decided to incorporate the Panama and New York
Conventions. Therefore, the FAA highlights the prominence of
the Panama Convention's application in United States national
law through the Act's Third Chapter, which Congress passed in
2002.74 In fact, although international arbitration grew first
through contracting states joining the New York Convention in
1958," the FAA further shows it favors a regional adoption of the
1975 Panama Convention over the New York Convention when
both apply. 76 Thus, the passage of the FAA provides valuable
insight to how the United States affords the Panama Convention
its own weight in national legislation.
These progressions incorporating the Panama Convention in
United States legislation show that America recognizes the impor70. See generally United States Arbitration Act, Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925),
codified as amended FAA, supra note 53, §§ 1-16.
71. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also S.
REP. NO. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924).
72. Jaquelyn A. Beatty, Recent Developments In Case Law Affecting Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 265, 266-68 (2001-2002).
73. See, e.g., Dederick's Adm'rs v. Richley, 19 Wend. 108, 111 (N.Y. Sup. 1838);
Neely v. Buford, 65 Mo. 448, 451 (1877); Camp v. Root, 18 Johns. 22, 23 (N.Y.Sup.
1820); Pike v. Emerson, 5 N.H. 393, 393 (N.H. 1831).
74. FAA, supra note 53, § 301.
75. New York Convention, supra note 13.
76. FAA, supra note 53, § 305(1). Due to the similarities between the New York
and Panama Conventions, Congress even entered a clause into Chapter III of the FAA
to help prevent confusion between the two Conventions. Compare FAA, supra note 53,
§ 305 (stating "[ilf a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens
of a [Country] that [has] ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are
[members] of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention
shall apply), with New York Convention, supra note 13, Art. VII (stating that "[t]he
provisions of the [New York Convention] shall not affect the validity of multilateral or
bilateral agreements."). However, scholars and case law still demonstrate that
misunderstandings exist when it comes to each Convention's actual application in
practice. See infra Sec. IV.
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tance of this regional arbitral instrument in a legal field that has
grown tremendously.7 7 With the passage of the UNCITRAL international agreement and the national FAA instrument, the United
States has incorporated a system to help ensure the international
enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards.7 ' Thus, the
strong interest and the appeal of international arbitration allows
for the betterment of a uniform dispute resolution system in the
Americas.

III.

TEXTUAL AND JUDICIAL DISCOVERIES OF THE PANAMA
CONVENTION: REGIONAL, ARBITRATION BENEFITS

The American states took different approaches to recognizing
the benefits of arbitration, but each region eventually realized the
importance of having a regional international arbitration instrument.7 ' As American states began to appreciate the protections of
arbitration, international commercial practice offered many
important developments in the unification of arbitration laws and
rules.so Therefore, the Panama Convention's legal significance
flows from a better understanding of its text and procedure [A]
and a comprehensive judicial interpretation of two recent United
States decisions dealing with the Panama Convention and its
arbitral counterpart, the New York Convention [B].

A.

An Overview To The Arbitration Process Under
The Panama Convention

Historically, the field of commercial arbitration desired a uniform application and interpretation in enforcing agreements and
awards."' Indeed, the Panama Convention achieves both historical and modern goals of arbitration that create a desirable process
for its application.8 2 Therefore, this section provides an understanding of each of the thirteen articles under the Convention.
Article I changes the application of former Latin American
77. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 97-98 (revealing a strong pro-enforcement
policy of the Panama Convention under United States law).
78. Id. at 97.
79. Rinker, supra note 42, at 480.
80. Martin Domke, Recent Development in InternationalCommercial Arbitration,
2 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 267, 267 (1969).
81. Id. (citing Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law on the Work of its First Session, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, UNCITRAL, U.N.
Doc A/ 7216 at 23 (1968)).
82. Beatty, supra note 71, at 265 (stating that privacy, simplicity, informality,
flexibility, and time and cost savings are all benefits of arbitration).
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jurisprudence and allowed for arbitration under the Convention to
settle "any differences that may arise or have arisen between [the
parties]."83 The Convention now follows the modern business
trend in expanding the scope of agreements to include
"exchange[s] of letters, telegrams, or telex communications."84
Article II allows parties to delegate a third party as an arbitrator,
whether or not they are a natural or juridical person."5 This process was not possible under older methods of arbitration.8 6
Article III provides a unique procedural aspect. It states that
if the parties do not have an express agreement, then "the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure
of the [IACAC."" Thus, the Panama Convention allows parties to
default to the rules of procedure under the IACAC, which supersedes any domestic procedural rules that may be applicable." By
establishing the IACAC, Article III became the first international
commercial arbitration article that acknowledged an administrative body to cover it."
Article IV provides a significant and lasting change in the
field of commercial arbitration, stating that an "arbitral decision
or award . . . [has] the force of a final judicial judgment."" Article
V provides the only option where a party or court can refuse to
recognize or enforce an arbitral decision." This article parallels
Article V of the New York Convention and examines different
remedies that a party can take in order to achieve non-enforcement." Article VI also mirrors the New York Convention providing for a competent authority to postpone the execution of an
arbitral decision." It also allows the authority "to instruct the
other party [to the arbitration] to provide appropriate
guaranties."9 4
Article VII is significant because it allows the Convention to
83. Norberg, supra note 52, at 614.
84. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. I.
85. Norberg, supra note 52, at 614.
86. Id.
87. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. III.
88. Norberg, supra note 52, at 615; see UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note
67, (incorporating the IACAC Rules of Procedure).
89. Norberg, supra note 52, at 615.
90. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. IV.
91. Jackson, supra note 50, at 96.
92. Norberg, supra note 52, at 616; Jackson, supra note 50, at 96.
93. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. VI.
94. Id.
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be open for signature by members of the OAS."6 Article VIII further elaborates that the Convention is open to ratification by the
member states.96 Article IX adds an important provision stating
that the Convention "shall remain open for accession by any other
State."97 These articles show that the Panama Convention favors
its application not only within the inter-American states but also
to other areas of the world.9"
Article X provides for the date the Convention enters into
force. 99 Article XI provides for the applicability of declarations for
states that have signed, ratified, or acceded to the Panama Convention. 00 Article XII allows the Convention to "remain in force
indefinitely, but any of the States Parties may denounce it."'O'
Finally, Article XIII provides for parties to consider each language
of the original instrument's text as authentic.102
The applicability of these thirteen articles shows that the
American states adopted the principles of international arbitration together. Embodied within the text and structural contours
of the Convention, this international arbitration document
respected the unique, regional goals and cultural aspects of the
American countries that helped create it. Thus, its independent
significance deserves credit for incorporating the ideals of its contracting states.

B.

Two United States Case Studies in Action

Understanding the legal impact of the Panama Convention
requires more than just a mere breakdown of its text. The instrument gains significance from its entry into force and its application upon the member parties to it.' 03 However, while designed as
an international arbitration tool, the Panama Convention, like
other arbitral Conventions, must sometimes pass under the auspices of judicial proceedings.10 4 Thus, two important United
95. Id. at art. VII.
96. Id. at art. VIII.
97. Id. at art. IX.
98. Norberg, supra note 52, at 616.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. X.
Id. at art. XI.
Id. at art. XII.
Id. at art. XIII.
103. 1VIALGOSIA FITZMAURICE, Treaties, in Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public
International Law,
16, 49 (Feb. 2010) (showing that a Convention is commonly
referred to as another name for a treaty and that a treaty's entry into force acquires
full legal force as a legal act).
104. See generally RZS Holdings AVV v. DVSA Petroleos S.A., 598 F. Supp. 2d 762,
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States decisions outline recent judicial treatment of the Panama
Convention in relation to the New York Convention: the Termorio
decision [i] and the DRC, Inc. decision [i].
i.

The Termorio Decision

In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals handed down the
revolutionary Termorio v. Elecantra decision.1 o5 In Termorio, a
Colombian state-owned public utility company entered into a
purchase agreement with a Colombian energy supplier to generate power. 0 6 A dispute arose, and the parties first went to arbitration in Colombia under the arbitral clause found in the parties'
agreement. 10 7 The tribunal awarded over $60 million to the
energy supplier, and the utility company appealed to the highest
Colombian administrative court by filing an "extraordinary writ"
to overturn the award.'0 a The Colombian court nullified the award
from the arbitral tribunal that was in favor of the utility company
because the arbitration clause in the agreement violated Colombian state law.109
Hoping to seek relief in the United States, the utility company
subsequently filed a lawsuit in a United States District Court for
the enforcement of the arbitral award and cited to the FAA for
support."o However, the District Court dismissed the claim for
three reasons: lack of standing, failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted, and forum non-conviens. The lower court
cited to the popular New York Convention annulment provision,
found in Article V(1)(e), that allows for the recognition and
enforcement of an award to be refused "if that party furnishes ...
proof that: .

.

. [tlhe award . .. has been set aside .

.

. by a compe-

tent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.""'
On appeal, the issue concerned whether the previous Colom762 (E.D. Va. 2009) affd sub nom RZS Holdings AVV v. DVSA Petroleo S.A., 383 F.
App'x 281 (4th Cir. 2010); Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc.,
257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A.
v. Faberge USA Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 41 (2d Cir. 1994); Empresa Constructora Contex
Limitada v. Iseki, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2000).
105. Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Elecantra S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
106. Id. at 929.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see supra Part II.B for a more thorough discussion of the FAA.
111. Termorio S.A. E.S.P., 487 F.3d at 930 (citing New York Convention, supra note
13, art. V(1)(e)).
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bian arbitration award from the tribunal was considered binding.112 The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment from the
United States court below and stated that the award had been
properly "set aside" by the highest administrative court in Colombia, which was a "competent authority" in the State where the
arbitration award was made.1 13 In its rationale, the Court of
Appeals looked not only to the New York Convention, but also to
the Panama Convention to determine the appropriate international agreement." 4 The energy supplier argued that the Panama
Convention applied instead of the New York Convention.' However, the appellate court decided to apply the New York Convention even though the United States and Colombia were both
signatories to both Conventions." 6 The Court stated binary reasons for applying the former instead of the latter arbitration
instrument: (1) the "relevant provisions" of the two Conventions
were "substantively identical," and (2) neither party objected the
lower court's analysis applying Article V(1)(e) under the New York
Convention." 7
ii.

The DRC, Inc. Decision

The Termorio decision in 2007 follows the court's approach
applying the relevant provisions of the New York and Panama
Conventions as one and the same."' On March 28, 2011, the
United States District Court for the District of Colombia handed
down one of the latest decisions regarding the application and
scope of both the New York and Panama Conventions.1 19 In DRC,
112. Termorio S.A. E.S.P., 487 F.3d at 930.
113. Id.; New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(e).
114. Termorio S.A. E.S.P., 487 F. 3d at 933.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See RZS Holdings AVV v. DVSA Petroleos S.A., 598 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (E.D.
Va. 2009); affd sub nom RZS Holdings AVV v. DVSA Petroleo S.A., 383 F. App'x 281
(4th Cir. 2010); Louis M. Solomon, Panama Convention and New York Convention
InterpretedConsistently; Action To Enforce Arbitral Award Stayed Pending Litigation
in Honduras, CADWALADER INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE LAw BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012), http:I
blog.internationalpractice.org/international-practice/panama-convention-and-newyork-convention-interpreted-consistently-action-to-enforce-arbitral-award-stayedpending-litigation-in-honduras.html http:/Iblog.internationalpractice.org/
international-practice/panama-convention-and-new-york-convention-interpretedconsistently-action-to-enforce-arbitral-award-stayed-pending-litigation-inhonduras.html; Ted Folkman, Case of the Day: DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras,
LETTERS BLOGATORY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://Iettersblogatory.com/2011/03/31/case-ofthe-day-drc-inc-v-republic-of-honduras/.
119. DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 67 (D.D.C. 2011).
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Inc., a contractor brought an action in the United States to enforce
a foreign arbitral award from Honduras against the State based
on a construction contract formed under Honduran law.12 0 An
arbitral tribunal in Honduras awarded over $51 million to the
contractor, and he asked the Honduran Supreme Court to confirm
his arbitral award against the Republic of Honduras. 121 After he
petitioned the Honduran court, the contractor also sought recognition and enforcement from a United States District Court.122
The District Court held that because the contractor asked the
Honduran Supreme Court to recognize and enforce the arbitration
award before commencing his lawsuit in the United States, the
District Court could properly stay the United States proceeding
under the Panama Convention.12 3 The court reasoned that both
parties in the case had agreed that the Panama Convention
applied even though both countries were signatories to the New
York Convention as well. 124 The court went on to state that both
Conventions were "intended to achieve the same results and their
key provisions adopt the same standards. ... "125 It also enumerated that multiple articles of both Conventions are "substantively
identical."126 Thus, while the parallel pending action in Honduras
took place, the United States' proceeding would not yet enforce the
foreign arbitration award rendered in the Republic of Honduras
due to the appropriate guarantees of the Panama Convention.127

IV.

THE EFFECTS OF SEPARATE TREATMENT: AN AVANTGARDE EXPLORATION OF PANAMA CONVENTION

TODAY
The textual interpretations and judicial applications of the
Panama Convention show that tribunals and courts should treat
it as a separate document from the New York Convention. Even if
these two Conventions contain many of the same common goals in
international arbitration, each Convention deserves distinct treatment allowing the documents to fulfill their different interpreta120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 67-68.
123. Id. at 76.
124. Id. at 71.
125. Id. at 71 (citing Energy Transp., Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 F. Supp. 2d
186, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
126. Id. (citing Int'l Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 396
(7th Cir. 2002)).
127. Id. at 76.
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tions and applications while also maintaining their proper scope.
Thus, taking an avant-garde approach of separate treatment may
prove to be exactly what the arbitral process needs to further the
benefits of international arbitration for two reasons: the friction
that results by applying the Panama and New York Conventions'
underlying structures and texts as the same [A], and the confusion seen by United States courts in their identical application
and implementation of the two Conventions [B].

A.

Textual Friction of Whether Similar Treatment Is
Favorable: A Better UnderstandingOf The True
Differences Between The New York And Panama
Conventions

Both the New York and Panama Conventions are pro-international commercial arbitration documents that attract attention
and popularity.'2 8 However, the structure and text of the Panama
Convention show that tribunals should treat it as its own document; in fact, friction results when it is treated equivalently to the
New York Convention.1 29 Comparing the thirteen articles found in
the Panama Convention to the sixteen articles in the New York
Convention, several similarities, but also many differences, materialize.'30 Thus, six important areas emerge for comparison within
the structure of the documents, and all provide essential distinctions found between the instruments that favor separate treatment: (1) the commercial relationship requirement; (2) the
limitation of annulments of international awards; (3) the defined
legal relationships among the Conventions; (4) the meaning of foreign and non-domestic awards; (5) the applicability of reciprocity
in arbitration awards; and (6) the application of the IACAC rules.
First, both the New York and Panama Conventions apply to
arbitral decisions arising out of "commercial" relationships. 131 The
New York Convention's approach to the commercial relationship
128. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 117; MIA1VII INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
http://miamiinternationalarbitration.com/en/events/details/17-the-newyork-european-and-panama-conventions-do-they-have-a-future.html (last visited Jan.
15, 2012).
129. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1106.
130. See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and
Panama Convention 1975: Redundancy or Compatibility?, 5 ARB. INT'L 214, 229
(1989), available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/publications/full-textpublications/full-text-publications/the-new-york-convention-1958-and-panamaconvention- 1975-redundancy-or-compatibility.
131. BORN, supra note 49, at 2361.
SOCIETY,
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requirement applies to both the arbitral awards and agreements.132 However, the Panama Convention provides slightly different language, stating that "[a]n agreement in which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitral decision any differences that may
arise or have arisen between them with respect to a commercial
transactionis valid."133 This language is different in the Panama
Convention than under the New York Convention. In fact, scholars have made clear that no generally accepted definition of the
word "commercial" exists in the context of international arbitrations. 134 Nonetheless, the "commercial transaction" requirement
still applies both to arbitration agreements and awards if the parties' underlying arbitration agreement falls under the Panama
Convention's scope.'3 Therefore, the term "commercial" appears
to encompass similar meanings under both the Conventions
despite disparities in sentence structure, language, and definition.
Second, the Panama and New York Conventions apply similar treatment in the annulment of international awards. 136 The
drafting history of the New York Convention shows that the drafters did not expressly contemplate issues of defining the standards
of non-recognition for an annulled award,'3 ' but they surely
intended to limit the chances of parties abusing the arbitration
system through multiple annulment proceedings. 3 81In its current
text, Article V of the New York Convention shows that a party
may refuse to enforce an award, but only if the resisting party
establishes one of the encompassing conditions: five under Section
I or two under Section II,139 which also encompasses the "public
policy" exemption in avoiding enforcement of an arbitral award.140
Article V of the Panama Convention also provides treatment for
the annulment of awards in similar language, and scholars often
view it as paralleling Article V of the New York Convention. 4 ' It
132. Id. (quoting the New York Convention, supra note 13, art. 1(3) ("[Any
contracting State may also] declare that it will apply the Convention only to
differences arising out of legal relationships,whether contractual or not, which are
considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration.") (emphasis added)).
133. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. I (emphasis added).
134. HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 4-5.
135. BORN, supra note 49, at 2362.
136. See id. at 2117.
137. GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 336
(2004).
138.

BORN,

supra note 49, at 2406.

139. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
140. Jackson, supra note 50, at 91.
141.

BORN,

supra note 49, at 2339.
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also provides seven grounds divided in two sections where an
award can be annulled. 4 2 These texts of the Conventions show
that if a party desires an annulment action, it can only bring the
claim at the place of the arbitral situs or under the law of the state

where the award was made. 14 3
Because the Panama Convention encompasses only the
regional scope of the American states, the actual amount of
annulled awards is more likely to be less than under the New
York Convention.144 In fact, an impressive number of courts routinely look to the New York Convention's Article V, which is popular because it does not impose limits for the annulment of arbitral
awards.' 4 5 However, under the Panama Convention, if a tribunal
issues an award in the United States, it has the effect equal to a
judgment. Thus, this key feature emerges to make the Panama
Convention unique:146 the Convention does not contain any article
discussing the enforcement of arbitration agreements.'4 7 An arbitral award under the Panama Convention has great power and
requires execution rather than enforcement.'4 8 Thus, while the
language and treatment of the annulment of awards may be similar, the regional application of the Panama Convention to the
Americas can affect annulment actions differently than the vast
scope of the New York Convention.
Third, both the New York and Panama Conventions apply in
varying degrees to legal relationships.149 Article II of the New
142. Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. 5.
143. BORN, supra note 49, at 2417 (citing Unionamerica Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
302 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868-69 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mutual
Marine Offices, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 362, 371-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 344 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 2003)).
144. Jackson, supra note 50, at 93; see UNCITRAL, supra note 14 (showing 146 party
countries), and Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
1975, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (2007) (showing 19 total signatures and
ratifications), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=31620.
145. See, e.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons WLL v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d
15, 22 (2d Cir. 1997); Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Petrambangan Minyak Dan
Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2003); Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v.
Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, 745 F. Supp. 172, 181 (S.D.N.Y 1990).
146. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1117.
147. HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 20.
148. Panama Convention, supra note 15, arts. V-VI (providing first, the only
grounds for refusing to recognize and enforce an award and second, the ability of a
competent authority to delay the execution of the award); see Hamilton, supra note
20, at 1106 (showing that "the Panama Convention does not contain formal
requirements for obtaining the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award. . . .").
149. BORN, supra note 49, at 2363.
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York Convention states that "[e]ach Contracting State shall ...
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration."" 0 The requirement from
this Article shows that an award may only be enforceable if it
arises from a "defined legal relationship."'' The legal relationship's textual analysis under the Panama Convention applies in a
different sense. Article I only extends to "commercial transactions" and does not specifically provide a "defined legal relationship" like in the New York Convention.1 52 However, because the
Panama Convention favors a pro-enforcement strategy within its
Contracting States even for non-contractual claims, it should not
be confined to the strict "legal relationship" definition found in
Article II of the New York Convention.1 3 Therefore, the distinct
and separate use of the legal relationship standard under each
Convention favors independent treatment.
Fourth, each Convention takes a different territorial
approach. The New York Convention states in its title that it
applies to "foreign" and "non-domestic awards."154 The Panama
Convention's title, on the other hand, applies to "international
commercial arbitration" disputes."' In the United States, the
FAA adopted the New York Convention approach in order to have
uniform application.'56 It also evidenced that the Panama Convention was to "be interpreted as conferring the same protections
as, the New York Convention.""' However, outside of the United
States, the question remains whether courts should adopt the
New York Convention approach or the Panama Convention
approach to territoriality if the state is a member to both Conventions."' Because both Conventions handle the territorial functions differently, this area also favors separate application.
150. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. 11(1).
151. Id.; BORN, supra note 49, at 2363.
152. Compare Panama Convention, supra note 15, art. I, with New York
Convention, supra note 13, art. 11(1).
153. BORN, supra note 49, at 2363.
154. New York Convention, supra note 13.
155. Panama Convention, supra note 15.
156. FAA, supra note 53, § 304.
157. BORN, supra note 49, at 2385.
158. See BORN, supra note 49, at 2384, (stating that "[ilt is unclear ... whether the
New York Convention's territorial application to "foreign" awards or the European
Convention's approach to awards between parties from different Contracting States
should be adopted.").
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Fifth, the reciprocity provisions between the two Conventions
call for separate treatment. Reciprocity encompasses the idea of
generally returning one's behavior, or a kind of tit-for-tat strategy,
that provides for overall cooperation even when no authority
exists on the matter. 159 While reciprocity contains important
implications in international law in general, it also plays an
important role in international arbitration.'60 The New York Convention's reciprocity provisions can be found in Articles 1(3) and
XIV.' 6' However, the Panama Convention contains no reciprocity
provision in its text.162 In fact, there is no inclination that the
drafters of the Panama Convention even implied such a provision
in the drafting history. 16 3 While the New York Convention contains two reciprocity provisions, the regional Panama Convention
is void of any similar language.'6 4 In fact, renowned Professor
Albert van den Berg remarked under his New York Convention
"Draft Proposal" to eliminate the reciprocity requirement in order
to achieve a more modern, uniform approach to arbitration that
would hopefully narrow the gaps between the two Conventions.165
Without even an inference of a reciprocity provision, the Panama
Convention should be entitled to its own treatment by tribunals
and courts aside from the New York Convention.
Sixth, the application of the IACAC rules displays another
area of variance between the New York and Panama Conventions.
Each Convention incorporates important procedural rules guaranteed in the arbitration process.166 However, the applicability of the
159. Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in InternationalLaw, 36

CORNELL INT'L

L.J.

93, 93 (2003).
160. BORN, supra note 49, at 2389.
161. See New York Convention, supra note 13, Art. 1(3) (stating that "any State
may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting state," and New York Convention Art. XIV (stating that "[a] Contracting
State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other
Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the
Convention.").
162. BORN, supra note 49, at 2396.
163. Id..

164. See supra notes 160-61.
165. See Alert Jan van den Berg, Striving for Uniform Interpretation,in ENFORCING
41, 42 (U.N ed., 1999); see

ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION

also G.A. Res., 61/33, 5, U.N. Doc. A/61/453 (Dec. 18, 2006) (showing the importance
of promoting harmony and uniformity in international commercial arbitration).
166. Compare the Panama Convention, supra note 15, Art. III (incorporating the
IACAC Rules of Procedure) with the New York Convention, supra note 13, Art. III
(incorporating the rules of procedure in accordance with the territory where the
award is relied upon).
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IACAC rules for the Panama Convention differs from the other
procedural rules under the New York Convention.'6 7 In fact, Article III of the Panama Convention expressly provides for
mandatory use of the IACAC Rules when there is no agreement as
to which procedural matters to apply.168 However, even with such
comparisons, a close inspection of the texts reveals differences
that call for disparity and friction in application.'69 While the two
Conventions embody pro-arbitration ideals, their scopes differ:
from a "universal"'7 0 influence among all of the countries of the
New York Convention to the regional regime of the Panama
Convention.

B.

Judicial Confusion: A Problematic Way To Achieve
Arbitral Uniformity

The text and structural differences between the Panama and
New York Conventions can cause friction for counsel and tribunals in arbitrations."' However, United States courts should also
strongly question whether the similar treatment of the New York
and Panama Conventions is actually a favorable alternative for
American jurisprudence. Today, courts routinely apply the two
Conventions identically when arbitral disputes cross over into the
judicial realm.'72 A quick or decisive leap to the same application
can lead to a further confused misunderstanding of even the most
basic guiding principles underlying each of the separate documents. 17 3 In fact, confusion between the New York and Panama
167. van den Berg, supra note 129, at 229.
168. Panama Convention, supra note 15, Art. III; see NIGEL BLACKABY, DAVID
LINDSEY
& ALESSANDRO SPINILLO Overview of Regional Developments, in
AMERICA 1, 6 (2002); see also Anderra Energy
Corp. v. SAPET Dev. Corp., 22 Y.B. Com. Arb. 1077, 1085 (N.D. Tex 1997).
169. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1106 (showing that Professor van den Berg
queried whether the two Conventions could "co-exist" together).
170. BORN, supra note 49, at 2389.
171. Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1106.
172. Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Elecantra S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Int'l
Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2002);
Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1994); Energy Transp. Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 F. Supp. 2d 186, 198
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Empresa Constructora Contex Ltd. v. Iseki, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 1020,
1024 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Progressive Cas. Ins. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN

Venezuela, 802 F. Supp. 1069, 1074-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
173. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, InternationalArbitration and the Republic of Colombia:
Commercial, Comparative and Constitutional Concerns from a U.S. Perspective, 22
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47, 51 n.27 (2011); contra Hamilton, supra note 20, at 1106
(quoting Professor van den Berg that "no major conflict between both Conventions
would seem to arise.").
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Conventions hinders the very uniformity that arbitration seeks.174
Therefore, courts should also treat each Convention as its own
individual instrument that encompasses the ideals of its drafters
and the values of a peaceful, international dispute resolution
system.
Both the Termorio and DRC, Inc. decisions exemplify the judicial problems of interpretation and application of the two Conventions as the same. First, the 2007 Termorio decision showed that
a United States court applied the New York Convention concerning a Colombian court annulment of an arbitral award on the
grounds that the decision to agree to arbitrate violated local
Colombian public policy rules. 7 1 Second, the 2011 DRC, Inc. case
showed that the Panama Convention applied in a Honduran construction contract case to avoid duplicative litigation actions in
the United States and Honduras. 176 Looking to these two cases,
one can see that even the most apt of judges can confuse when to
apply each Convention; every country involved in these disputes
have ratified or accepted both of the Conventions.' 77 Thus, one
must wonder why one United States court chose to apply the New
York Convention and the other opted to apply the Panama
Convention.
The Termorio decision exemplifies how United States courts
often use the New York Convention for its rulings.17 1 Within the
first two paragraphs of the decision, Senior Circuit Judge
Edwards cited to both the FAA and the New York Convention
without even mentioning the Panama Convention.179 While the
Appellate Court does go on to discuss the applicability of each
Convention in its analysis, it ultimately sides with the lower
court, which decided to not even discuss the applicability of the
Panama Convention in the dispute because its application was
174. See G.A. Res. 61/33, supra note 164, 5.
175. Termorio, 487 F.3d at 930.
176. DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2011).
177. The countries involved in the Termorio decision are the United States and

Columbia; the countries involved in the DRC, Inc. decision are the United States and
Honduras. For a complete list of member countries to the New York and Panama
Conventions, see Status - 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards,
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/enl
uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html; see also Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 1975, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION (2007), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=31620 (showing 19 total signatures
and ratifications).

178. See, e.g., Yusuf, supra note 144, at 18-19; Karaha Bodas, supra note 144, at
287-88; Telenor Mobile Comm. AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 405 (2d Cir. 2009).

179. See Termorio, 487 F.3d at 929.
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"unnecessary."' The Appellate Court took another approach, but
still quickly dismissed the Panama Convention for slightly different reasons.'"' The court did not necessarily resolve the lower
court's decision of whether the codification of the Panama Convention into United States law incorporated the New York Convention; however, it did go on to state that the relevant provisions
between the two Conventions are "substantively identical."'8 2
With that decisive step, and because the parties did not previously
object to the lower court's decision to use the New York Convention, the Appellate Court decided to solely reach its decision without the Panama Convention.183
Interestingly enough, the Termorio case shows that, despite
the United States' adherence to the latter set forth in Chapter III
of the FAA, courts can still choose to apply to the New York Convention over the Panama Convention when both apply.'84 The reason why regional arbitral Conventions exist is to incorporate
arbitration's overall goals while still representing the ideals of
each nation involved."' The Panama Convention incorporates the
history of a long mistrusting nature of Latin American countries
with the recognized benefits of international arbitration.'86 Thus,
although international arbitration's goal may be to achieve
greater consistency, consistency is lost when courts continue to
deem two separate Conventions as the same instrument.
Further, the DRC, Inc. decision also shows the confusion that
courts have in applying the two international arbitration Conventions."' In that case, the court came to the opposite conclusion as
the Termorio court and applied the Panama Convention over the
New York Convention. Within the first sentence of its Legal Standard discussion, the DRC, Inc. court abruptly and decisively used
the Panama Convention where the Termorio court seemed to take
180. Id. at 933 (stating that the Panama Convention "incorporates by reference the
relevant provisions of the New York Convention. . . ... However, the Panama
Convention never once mentions nor references the New York Convention in its
actual text.).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. But see Nicor Int'l. Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1371 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 305).
185. See generally European Convention, supra note 15; see also Moscow
Convention, supra note 15.
186. HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 20.
187. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 174, at 51 n.27.
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the opposite approach in applying the New York Convention.' In
DRC, Inc., although the parties agreed that the Panama Convention applied, the court still went further in a brief analysis of why
it applied the Panama Convention over the New York Convention.' 9 In its analysis, even though the court used substantially
similar reasoning as the Termorio court, it to came to the opposite
conclusion in deciding which Convention to use.19 0 Indeed, District
Court Judge Friedman quoted that "[b]oth conventions .

.

. are

intended to achieve the same results ... [and] are substantively
identical."' 9 ' However, DRC, Inc. and Termorio both show how
judicial courts are confused: in fact, federal courts will never be
able to achieve a greater uniformity of results under the two Conventions if they continue to use them identically.19 2 Because
courts use the Conventions inconsistently but also interchangeably, decisions may overlook, disregard, or worse, never even taken
into account some of their key differences.193
Although the two Conventions do share many arbitral ideals
in common, the Termorio and DRC, Inc. decisions show the danger
that future courts may never even reach the Panama Convention
in their judgments despite the FAA, Inter-American Convention,
and other statutory instruments 9 4 that support a regional Convention's use. The New York Convention is one of the most essential arbitral instruments for the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitral awards.'95 However, even despite the prominence of the New York Convention, courts should still recognize
the essential differences that it has when it overlaps with the Pan188. Compare DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C.
2011), with Termorio, 487 F.3d at 933.
189. DRC, Inc., at 71.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Energy Transp. Ltd. v. M.V. San Sebastian, 348 F. Supp. 2d 186,
198 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Int'l Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F. 3d 392,
396 (7th Cir. 2002)).
192. Cf. Energy Transp. Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 501,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678); InterAmerican Convention on InternationalCommercialArbitration, NEXT CLIENT (2011),
http://www.lawlisting.com/alternative-dispute-resolution/inter-american-conventioninternational-commercial-arbitration/show-article (showing that using the Panama
Convention may result in a more favorable outcome in certain circumstances over
using the New York Convention).
193. See supra Part IV.A.
194. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C § 302 (2006).
195. BORN, supra note 49, at 2334; HULEATT-JAMES & GOULD, supra note 11, at 1819; KEVIN C. KENNEDY, Invalidity of Foreign Arbitration Agreement or Arbitral
Award, § 3, in AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS (3d ed., 1995) (last updated June 2011).
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ama Convention."' However, depending on the amount in controversy, applying the Panama Convention, in place of the New York
Convention, could result in substantially increased administrative
costs.1 97 The regional character of the Panama Convention helps
incorporate the historical approaches to international arbitration
from not only a United States perspective but also from a Latin
American standpoint.'98 Thus, the recent trend in United States
judicial decisions to handle the two Conventions identically illustrates the vital importance of having separate treatment for the
two Conventions.
The legislative histories, textual differences, and judicial
application between the two documents show that tribunals and
courts should, at the very least, compare the Panama and New
York Conventions instead of treating them identically. Due to the
differences between the two documents, the risks of friction, disparity, and confusion may further develop in the arbitral
processes over time. Thus, in order for federal courts and arbitral
tribunals to truly achieve "greater uniformity,""'9 they should
apply the New York and Panama Conventions separately even if
they are "intended to achieve the same result."2 00
V.

CONCLUSION: THE PANAMA CONVENTION DESERVES ITS
OWN SEPARATE TREATMENT

The Panama and New York Conventions are two of America's
leading and best-known international arbitration tools. In order
to avoid the friction and confusion that can develop by applying
the treaties as one and the same, tribunals and courts should
carefully interpret each Convention. Although some of the Conventions' differences may appear to be inconsequential, their overall, cumulative effect coupled with particular problems in
application show that the Panama Convention warrants it own
application. While many key provisions in both Conventions
remain similar, the conventions are not per se identical. In some
196. See supra Part IV.A.
197. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, NEXT
CLIENT,
(2012) http://www.lawlisting.com/alternative-dispute-resolution/interamerican-convention-international-commercial-arbitration/show-article (last visited
Mar. 12, 2012).
198. Compare Rinker, supra note 42, at 480, with Bishop & Etri,supra note 20, at
11-16.
199. Energy Transp. Ltd. v. M. V. San Sebastian, 348 F. Supp. 2d 186, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).

200. DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011).
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circumstances, such differences may even form a strong basis to
favor application of one treaty over the other. 201' Although courts
and tribunals want to achieve greater uniformity throughout the
field of international arbitration, the two Conventions' variances
must be taken into consideration in order to promote the fairest
and best outcomes possible.
With these reflections, the applicability and scope of the Panama Convention carries great weight in international commercial
arbitration. The Convention's appeal embodies the historical and
legal structures of arbitration taken by both Latin America and
the United States. Its text helps transform the overall interAmerican arbitration process into a living, active document that
can be used in a vast array of arbitrations. However, the United
States' trend of treating the Panama Convention identically to the
New York Convention raises alarm: not only do the Conventions
contain various important textual differences, they also confuse
United States courts and the arbitral developments in case law.
Thus, the Panama Convention not only deserves but should
require its own doctrinal distinctiveness in order to best continue
the principles appreciated by all of its members.

201. Next Client, supra note 198.

